For the time being, it seems, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan is prevailing over President Joe Biden. Sullivan, according to media reports, is arguing against the US consenting to Ukraine's armed forces using NATO–supplied weapons to strike targets in Russia. The case for giving such consent, on the other hand, has reportedly been led by Secretary of State Antony Blinken who has always possessed a more interventionist streak.
A key moment comes next week, when Ukraine's president visits the United States. Volodomyr Zelenskyy will attend the 79th Session the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The theme of the UNGA debate, which will bring together many leaders from round the world, is: 'Leaving no one behind: acting together for the advancement of peace, sustainable development and human dignity.' Zelenskyy has also pledged to present his 'peace plan' to the US during his visit.
It would be a symbolic occasion for the US to ease restrictions on Ukraine, even if it would be sure to provoke some heated discussion. It would clearly signal the US commitment to ensuring Ukraine's 'victory' as a prerequisite for peace.
Why does Ukraine want the US to ease restrictions?
For many months Ukrainian officials have been lobbying for a change in the US position. While some NATO members, including the UK, seem to be in principle in favour of allowing Ukraine to target Russia, the weapons they supply rely on US guidance systems. The US consequently has a de facto veto over a unilateral decision by the UK to ease restrictions on the Storm Shadow missiles it is supplying (read more on the technicalities of this here).
Ukrainian officials are no doubt nervous about the implications of November's US election for ongoing support. Not only does a prospective victory for Donald Trump imperil ongoing military and humanitarian support from Washington, but it may encourage other NATO members to reduce their commitments to Ukraine.
In a hint of future challenges with other NATO members, a meeting in Kyiv this week between Poland's foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski and Zelenskyy apparently ended tensely. Poland will assume the rotating presidency of the European Council for the first half of 2025 and, whilst it remains a key backer of Ukraine, reports suggest Poland sees its Council presidency as an opportunity to put pressure on Ukraine over other issues.
In terms of the war between Russia and Ukraine, the two main issues at stake in the debate over the use of weapons are the Ukrainian forces' ability to hold the territory it has captured inside Russia (on the Kursk offensive see this previous post) and their ability to reclaim the Russian–occupied territory in Ukraine itself. Ukrainian military leaders argue that consent to fire missiles at targets inside Russia will help them to achieve these goals. A little extra freedom, they suggest, would allow Ukraine to make decisive gains in fending off the Russian invasion.
An easing of restrictions would have several implications for Russia. A fundamental argument in support of easing the restrictions sooner rather than later has been that Russia could have been caught unprepared. It has already been reported that Russia has moved equipment back from the Ukrainian border, in anticipation of a changed US stance, and the need to keep such equipment safe from missile attacks complicates and slows Russia's supply lines to support its troops in Ukraine. It may already to be too late for Ukraine to take full advantage. Facilities such as airfields and factories, however, cannot be moved overnight.
As to whether the easing of restrictions would help Ukraine to achieve the two goals mentioned is far from clear cut. The restrictions don't seem to be preventing Ukraine from hitting targets inside Russia with recurring success. This week a Ukrainian drone strike destroyed a storage depot in Tver, roughly 300 miles inside the Russian border. The massive explosion at the depot made a mockery of the Russian military's claims that it had intercepted the attack drone.
The situation along the frontline in Ukraine's Donbas is fraught, especially near the key town of Pokrovsk. But Ukraine has not lost the town despite Russia not diverting resources away from the area to support its defences in Kursk (as many consider to have been the goal of the Kursk incursion). Likewise, Ukraine has held the territory in Russia's Kursk region relatively comfortably. A Russian counteroffensive, which aimed to retake the land, looks to have fizzled out. The US, therefore, might be questioning whether Ukraine actually needs the restrictions on the use of weapons to be lifted in order to achieve its goals.
A flawed US position?
The main concern in the US administration, as I've written before, seems to be a fear of Russia's potential response. In particular, there appears to be a concern that it could prompt Vladimir Putin to authorise the use of a nuclear weapon. There are two factors that count against this, however. The first is that it is not obvious that using a nuclear weapon on the battlefield in Ukraine will actually help Russia all that much in the current situation. The devastation and death toll would be horrific and yet it's unclear what Russian forces would gain militarily.
The second is that the geopolitical consequences are unpredictable and that must weigh even on Putin's mind. It is widely known that both China and India have cautioned Russia against using a nuclear weapon. How would they respond if he went ahead and used such a weapon? How would the rest of the world react to Russia using a nuclear weapon against a non–nuclear–weapon state? It could be more damaging to Russia's reputation than Putin is prepared for. That is part of the reason many think it is time to call Putin's bluff on nuclear weapons.
Together, these two factors also perhaps explain why some Russians have been calling on Putin to order a nuclear test in the Arctic. The point being that it would generate fear among global audiences without some of the negative consequences of a strike against Ukraine. Paradoxically, while uncertainty about what Russia will do cannot be eliminated, these points nonetheless undermine the US assumption that there is something to fear.
There is yet another reason to doubt Russia's threats would be followed through. The Tver depot hit this week was supposed to be able to withstand a nuclear explosion. Since it appears not to have survived a conventional missile strike from a drone, it must also raise questions about whether Russia is anywhere near as prepared for nuclear war as Putin would have us believe. One might wonder, as well, how prepared the US really is.
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