A few days ago, I wrote that Russia was unlikely to involve itself in the Niger situation, despite Yevgeny Prigozhin’s comments supportive of the coup leaders. He had said that they were leading ‘a battle by the people against the colonisers.’ In other words, he was encouraging the view that the coup represents an act of anti-Westernism – a cause Russia is usually rather keen to take up these days.
I did have pause for thought yesterday. The coup leaders rejected a threat from the regional bloc ECOWAS that they faced military intervention if they did not restore the constitutionally elected president to power. Instead, the coup leaders called on Prigozhin and his Wagner Group to provide them with support.
Will Russia intervene in the post-coup situation? There are reasons I can see why it might relish wading in a little deeper and so perhaps my previous comments were hasty. In fact, there is more great power politics at play that I appreciated: raw materials, an energy pipeline, and a challenge to the global order.
Niger and ‘the West’
Looking at a map of Africa, I wonder if there is an African state about which I know less than Niger. It appears that the country remains an important base for France and the United States in the Sahel, both of whom retain a military presence there. And both of whom are no doubt unpopular among the population of Niger, as former colonial ruler and modern-day ‘imperialist’ respectively.
France’s presence in its former African colonies has been waning for some time, and after its withdrawal from Mali last year it would seem it has come to depend on Niger more, although it still has a strong foothold in Chad. Perhaps the crucial detail is identified in this 2019 report, which notes that French troops ‘are deployed in Niger to secure uranium mines – run by the French state-owned company Areva and important for nuclear power plants and weapons – from terrorists.’
Uranium! – One hundred years ago it would have counted for nothing, but since the splitting of the atom, nuclear fission, and the advent of nuclear power and nuclear weapons, the possession of uranium deposits vests a state with significant power. In this case, most likely France rather than Niger is benefitting from the uranium mines. Niger, after all, is one of the poorest states in Africa. The IMF ranks Niger’s GDP per capita, measured by purchasing power parity, as 186th out of 192 countries globally (the lower ranking states are all also in Africa). So France is likely concerned if it loses its influence with the government in Niger.
Terrorists! – The United States, too, has an interest at stake: it operates drones out of an airbase in the heart of Niger, which is an important component in its counterterrorism activities in the Sahel. Its Acting Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland held talks with the coup leaders in the capital, Niamey, yesterday [1]. That is a very senior official to send, number two in the State Department, which shows how seriously the US considers the situation.
Nuland apparently pressed on the coup leader the dangers of accepting support from Wagner Group, telling the media: ‘The people who have taken this action … understand very well the risks to their sovereignty when Wagner is invited in.’ I’m not sure that will be sufficient to persuade the coup leaders, but we do not know what other messages the US official relayed aside from threats to cut aid. (The US has ‘paused’ aid for the time being.)
Niger and Russia: A gas pipeline and the uranium mines
In appealing to Wagner Group, the coup leaders are partly trying to forge alliances with juntas in Mali and Burkino Faso. Both of those neighbouring states have had their own coups in the past couple of years, and the ruling juntas are on friendly terms with Russia. Both states’ leaders attended the Russia-Africa summit in St Petersburg last week (mentioned briefly in my previous post).
Wagner Group has been advising the Malian junta, possibly directly involved in military campaigns, and Russia has been supplying the junta with military aid. The ECOWAS objection to the coup is probably quite fragile since both Mali and Burkino Faso are members (even if their memberships are currently suspended following their own coups), and both states are already endorsing the Niger coup. The Nigerien coup leaders are appealing to anti-Western sentiment that the juntas in Mali and Burkino Faso almost certainly nurture; the two neighbours said they would interpret any intervention against the coup leaders as ‘a declaration of war’ against their countries.
Russia has military agreements with all three states – with Mali cooperation is developing apace. Moscow signed an agreement with Niger in August 2017, which primarily deals with military training and enhancing cooperation. All these deals are part of Russia’s efforts, intensified after the imposition of western sanctions in 2014, to explore new partnerships.
It also sees another material interest which we can connect to western sanctions. One article in the Russian media points to the geopolitics round energy pipelines: it says that European states are keen to develop the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline as a way of weaning themselves of continued need for Russian gas, and Niger has been ‘captive’ to France for this goal (the pipeline passes through Nigeria, Niger and Algeria). Naturally, the author points to the ‘benefits’ Niger now has of cooperating with Russia to free itself from French captivity! One goal of Russian support for the coup leaders, then, will be disrupting EU efforts to diversify its energy dependency.
And a second goal of any Russian involvement, I posit, would be to prise those uranium mines out of French control. The deposed president was on good terms with the French, judging from what I have read over the past couple of days, and so a realignment of Niger is quite possible even without Russia doing much. Although those Russian flags the coup supporters have been waving on the Nigerien streets have presumably been supplied by the Russian embassy.
Longer-term importance
What happens in Niger is important for the African continent and beyond. The ousted president, Mohamed Bazoum, came to power in his country’s ‘first transfer of power between two democratically elected presidents since gaining independence [from France] in 1960’ (to quote the OECD). Following a series of coups in the Sahel, the coups in Africa’s ‘coup belt’ are undermining global hopes for the spread of democracy and Niger’s return to lawlessness is unhelpful for the so-called liberal rules-based order.
I don’t know if Russia will become more heavily involved (it could have become more deeply involved in Sudan than it has in the past few months), but I have outlined a couple of reasons why it might do so. This is what I have learnt these past few days.
After the end of the cold war, Moscow turned inwards and its influence in Africa fell precipitously. During Putin’s presidency, Russia has tried to return to the continent, largely by presenting itself as a security actor (through arms sales, but as a direct security provider too through the Wagner PMC). Economically, it is unlikely to compete with China, but it wants status as a global power – not merely the ‘regional power’ that Barack Obama once labelled it.
The war in Ukraine has dented those ambitions for status because it is western states that largely confer status in international relations at present. And yet. In Africa the Russians keep pushing for influence, keep sniffing for new opportunities to acquire raw materials and energy links, keep disrupting others’ interests, and keep the rest of the world staring down the barrel of a gun.
[1] Nuland is renown to Russians for handing out cookies during Ukraine’s Maidan protesters in 2013, which the Russians saw as American meddling in Ukraine, and she is renown to Europeans for a leaked recording in which her disregard for EU opinions bubbled over into her intercepted remark ‘Fuck the EU’.
Image credit: Photo from the Lebanese civil war by James Case from Philadelphia, Mississippi, U.S.A. - Checkpoint 4, Beirut, Lebanon 1982, CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=466361
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