At the beginning of July, at a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Astana, Belarus became the first European state to be granted membership of the bloc. The SCO was established at the beginning of the century, initially addressing border issues, but later expanding to deal with security matters more broadly. Its aims include tackling the 'three evils' of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
Belarus's accession this month is the culmination of a process that began in 2010 when Belarus became a 'dialogue partner' of the SCO. It held 'observer' status from 2015 and in mid–2022 formally applied for full membership.
The appeal to China of partnership with Belarus is far weaker than it once was. In the years before 2020, Belarus sought to position itself as a key junction on China's Belt and Road project, an ambitious development initiative building a new trading infrastructure spanning the Eurasian landmass. But following the political crisis beginning in 2020, western sanctions on Belarus have constrained its opportunity to present itself as a gateway into European markets. (The Belt and Road initiative has faced bigger setbacks, as well, as many European leaders have become increasingly hesitant about trading with China.)
At the same time, however, Belarus's membership of the SCO gives China an institutional inroad into Europe. Only days after welcoming Belarus into the SCO, Chinese soldiers were in Belarus for joint military exercises. The 'anti–terror' drills called 'Attacking Falcon' took place close to the Polish (and hence NATO) border. So I don't think the accession of Belarus to the SCO should be ignored or seen as insignificant.
For the Lukashenka regime, accession to the SCO is a signal to both domestic and foreign audiences that he retains some foreign policy autonomy. His regime has pursued relations with China in earnest as a mechanism for countering Russia's preponderant influence. The authorities will see their membership of a Chinese–dominated international organisation as a boon to the country's status. For those keen to doubt this claim, Lukashenka, while in Astana for the summit, met UN Secretary–General Antonio Guterres. His office dubiously claimed that engagement with the UN has 'bolstered Belarus'[s] positive image on the international arena': that's propaganda, but behind it sits the reality that such meetings serve to legitimise Lukashenka on the international stage which is very much to his benefit given how delegitimised he is viewed among western states.
The significance of the SCO's latest expansion says more about China than it does about Belarus though. Since its establishment two decades ago, the China–led SCO has grown considerably. It is not a military alliance like NATO but it has expanded its members' military cooperation over time. It has enlarged to include Iran, India and Pakistan in its ranks (quite a feat to have the last two in the same organisation!). It has given 'dialogue partner' status to several Middle Eastern states in the past couple of years. Each growth of the SCO expands China's influence round the globe.
At a time when there is fierce debate about NATO's enlargement, it is curious that so little attention is being paid to the enlargement of a China–led bloc into Europe.
All the president's men
This weekend, meanwhile, marks thirty years of Lukashenka's rule in Belarus. Next year he will (almost certainly) claim a seventh term in power. There have been a lot of changes in the key personnel in Minsk recently, since February's parliamentary election, and the most obvious way to view them is with a view to tightening discipline within the nomenklatura ahead of the 2025 presidential election.
Dmitry Krutoi became head of the presidential administration. Back in the pre–2020 era he was seen as one of the more 'liberal' figures in Belarusian political system and an advocate of economic reforms. He worked as deputy minister for the economy between 2014 and 2018, had a series of relatively quick promotions, and then Lukashenka sent him to be Belarus's ambassador to Russia (probably the most important diplomatic posting abroad for a Belarusian). For liberals, unfortunately, Krutoi has reformed only himself – into a loyal servant of the political system.
The appointment that interests me above all is the return of the tough–minded Natalia Petkevich. In the early 2000s she served as Lukashenka's press secretary. He clearly liked her. She later became deputy head of the presidential administration. When I first became interested in Belarus, the 'Iron Lady' was sometimes spoken of as a potential successor to Lukashenka; she was seen, meanwhile, as a firm but loyal hand for the dictator. She was dismissed from her role in 2014 and disappeared from the political scene. As I recall, it was said she had started up a tour agency. At some point she divorced from her first husband and married Valentin Rybakov, the Belarusian ambassador to the UN, and settled in New York. Now she's back in Minsk, serving as first deputy head of the presidential administration, and presumably bringing her reputation for being a disciplinarian back into the fold.
Other significant changes among senior officials that have caught Belarusian analysts' attention include the choice for new minister of information, Marat Markov, and the replacement of Sergey Aleinik as foreign minister. Markov, according to political analyst Artyom Shraibman, has proven himself an effective, neither noisy nor hot–headed, propagandist. As to Aleinik, formerly Belarus's ambassador to the UK, it seems to be agreed that he achieved little as foreign minister for Lukashenka. I've heard contradictory views about the new foreign minister, Maksim Ryzhenkov, but it's worth noting his appointment was accompanied with instructions from Lukashenka to 'shake things up'. One commentator notes that Ryzhenkov 'has a tough demeanour'. Shraibman, meanwhile, refers to reports he is 'active, capricious (своенравный), not very compromising, and indisputably loyal'.
Some do though see his appointment as an 'opportunity' for improved relations with the west. In support of this perspective, a small number of political prisoners were released, which is something western states have emphasised as one of their primary policy objectives in respect of Belarus. But as ever in Belarus, one can point to other appointments that imply the opposite, not to mention new arrests offsetting those released in the 'amnesty'.
If Ryzhenkov is seen as an opportunity for improving discussions with western partners, then the recently appointed chief of the general staff, Pavel Muraveyko, looks like an appointment made to appease Russia's wishes. He has openly spoken of Belarus's 'right' to seize the Sulwalki Gap (the strategically significant stretch of land along the Polish-Lithuanian border, connecting Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad). He has made a raft of belligerent, anti–western statements over the years. Accordingly, one should be careful in interpreting any individual appointment as a signal of Lukashenka's foreign policy ambitions.
Capital punishment
In alarming news from Belarus last week, a Minsk court reportedly sentenced a German citizen to death for 'terrorism'. The death penalty in Belarus has been in continuous use since independence, with the number of executions understood to be no more than a few each year during this century (secrecy around the death penalty means we cannot be sure of the numbers). I am unaware of a foreign citizen being sentenced to death in the past; if anyone knows otherwise please do leave a comment below.
German media reported that the German foreign ministry was giving consular support to its citizen but, once again, it is a reminder not to mistake the release of a few political prisoners as a sign of a softening of the regime's hard line approach.
And in the other Belarus...
The exiled opposition leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, came to Oxfordshire for the European Political Community summit at Blenheim Palace. She joined 50 European leaders and it was certainly a testament to her continued international profile that she was invited. She had conversations with Keir Starmer and other European leaders. There was, as well, a handshake with Volodomyr Zelenskyy.
So Lukashenka pulls towards China and the east. Tsikhanouskaya, pursuing her proclamations of Belarus's 'European future', pulls to the west.
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A footnote on Rico Krieger's sentence, which was commuted to a life sentence by Lukashenka on 30 July. Further to my comment about foreigners sentenced to death, Mediazone reports that at least 12 foreign citizens have been sentenced to death in Belarus in the past. These sentences were all handed down in the 1990s, when the death penalty was used more extensively, and all came from countries in the former Soviet Union (six Russians, two Ukrainians, one Kyrgyz, one Kazkakh, one Abkhazian/Georgian and one Latvian). At least one had their sentence commuted but most are known to have been executed.
In respect of Krieger, it is now highly likely he will be involved in a prisoner exchange and returned to…