Voting in Moldova last weekend and Georgia this coming weekend are both readily viewed through a geopolitical lens. These two small states are bellwether states for shifting Russian and western influence across the whole of eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. What can we expect from Moldova's second round of voting in its presidential election? And what can we expect to transpire in Georgia this weekend?
Moldova
Last weekend's voting in Moldova threw up a couple of surprises. The referendum on amending the constitution to enshrine European Union ambitions proved tighter than expected: in the end, 50.39% voted in favour of the amendments and 49.61% against. The difference amounting to not much more than 10,000 ballots. The result, while the one expected, fell well short of the 63% predicted by an opinion poll I cited in my previous blog.
On the other hand, in the simultaneously-held presidential election, the incumbent Maia Sandu received a higher vote share than opinion polls expected. She came away with 42% of the vote. Not attaining a majority, however, means she faces a run off vote against Russophile Alexandr Stoianoglo in two weeks' time. Stoianoglo received 26% of the votes.
While Sandu's vote share was significantly larger than Stoianoglo's, it is difficult to predict how the votes of the nine eliminated candidates will realign in the run off. The third and fourth highest vote shares went to Renato Usatii (14%) and Irina Vlah (5%); their voters will almost certainly fall behind Stoianoglo putting him up to 45%. Beyond that, it becomes too close to call. As I argued previously, it really does boil down to a contest for whether the country pulls towards Russia or the EU. A change in the constitution might not mean much should a Russophile president be elected.